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SUMMARY 
 
The main safety technique used for Subsea7 work activities is hazard identification 
and risk assessment (HIRA). This process shows how the work activities are 
conducted, supervised and managed correctly, in accordance with approved 
practices. The biggest challenge is communicating the risk out to the people 
executing the work. Make them understand the risk tied to the work.  
 
The goals with this master thesis were comparing different uncertainty factors and 
evaluate the different methods used in HIRA procedure. See what type of 
uncertainty tied to the procedures. What methods that are best in Subsea7 type of 
operations. Finally investigate the information received from the vessel.   
 
Uncertainty tied to the HIRAs 
The main purpose was to prove that Subsea7 had to take uncertainty into the 
calculation of risk. It shows that the risk description can be split into two parts, one 
covering events and consequences, and another that covers uncertainty. This 
acknowledges that risk cannot only be described and evaluated by referring to 
probabilities and evaluated consequences. It needs to be evaluated together with 
an uncertainty factor U. If Subsea7 implement factor U they will reduce the hazards 
from occurring. 
 
Methods used to identify measure and communicate risk 
Subsea7 HIRA contains parts of different risk identification methods and that is 
important for getting a better risk picture of the operation. The different techniques 
that are implemented are guidewords and task analysis. But it should also 
implement parts from SWIFT like “what if analysis”, this will question the 
procedures more. Also use FMECA on critical equipment so they don’t risk the whole 
operation stopping. That should give them better information about where the 
hazards are hidden. The best way of preparing the procedures is a combination of 
al the method evaluated, but that is time consuming.  
 
The HIRAs are a good tool for finding the hazards and calculating the risk level, but 
it can be improved by more precise information about where danger is hidden. 
Subsea7 can try to upgrade the HIRAs with one or two columns. One with cause 
(cause of hazards) and split the corrective measures in proactive measures (actions 
that prevent hazards from occurring) and protective measures (measures that 
protect people, assets and environment from the hazards). That way the evaluated 
risk will be easier to communicate out to the people doing the work and they will 
understand the risk better. 
 
The majority of employers who responded to the survey generally felt “safe” 
regarding offshore hazards and “satisfied” regarding safety measures on board their 
vessel. The respondents felt that the communication between the office and vessel 
could be better, and make the safety procedures user-friendlier. That could be 
something to focus on when management are making the new safety procedures 
for Subsea7.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In today`s world the energy industry is in the focus of public interest. This was 
clearly shown in summer 2010 when the Macondo field had a blowout, lead to the 
largest oil spill in the history of the industry(Kolberg and Hummel 2010). After this 
accident people start to focus even more on safety. It is important to take into 
account different types of hazards given that is a chance of something happen. In a 
human life one are exposed to risk regularly, and risk forces people to take 
decisions. But how do we know if these decisions taken are correct. Good decisions 
will improve peoples understanding of the risk tied to the work in the office and at 
the worksite. If one can make people more aware of what causes an unwanted 
event, then that will reduce the probabilities for an unwanted event to occur.  
 
Subsea 7 is a seabed –to-surface engineering, construction and service company to 
the offshore energy industry worldwide(2011). They concentrate on services that 
add value for clients throughout the lifecycle of their offshore energy fields. Their 
main risk tool for these operations is the hazard identification and risk assessment 
(HIRA) process. Their goal in each project is to reduce the risk as low as reasonable 
practicable (ALARP). Below is scope of tasks done in a HIRA process. 
  
• It starts with identifying al the hazards, which are the potential causes of harm, 
associated with work being undertaken. 
• Assessing the risk from the hazard.  
• Identify suitable control measures that eliminate or reduce the hazard from 
occurring.  
• Recording the HIRAs so it is easy to find them later on.  
• Implement the control measures on the worksite.  
• Control that the residual risk is ALARP. Residual risk is existing risk after control 
measures have been implemented.  
 
 
FIGURE 1‐1 – HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Subsea 7 uses a lot of recourses on reducing the risk to an acceptable level. And 
they want to know if the recourses used in the office is well spent. Are the risk 
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communicated in a right way. Do the HIRAs go the whole way from office to the 
vessel? This is a procedure that gets completely overview over risk tied to different 
operations. This method is based on finding events that can make damages to 
people, equipment and environment. The analysis method starts with planning of 
operation on land, and revised/updated on on-board the vessel before start-up. 
This way the risk is sent forth to the people involved in the operation. The model 
defines activities and uncovers consequence with an unwanted event. Further it 
defines a risk picture (High, medium and low) before corrective measures are 
installed. In the end corrective measures shall be specified for preventing unwanted 
events and then the new risk picture is defined.    
 
10 of January 2011 there was a fusion between Acergy and Subsea 7, the new 
company was named Subsea 7. The company became bigger and it presented some 
dilemma that they have double up with legacy Acergy on one hand and old legacy 
Subsea7 on the other. Now that they are making the new safety procedure, they 
want to know if they can use information from the old legacy Acergy procedure. 
How reliable is the legacy Acergy procedure? Is it possible to find something to 
improve from the old procedures? The legacy Acergy management system contains 
procedures of how management in Legacy Acergy is performing the operations in a 
safe manner. The HIRA procedure is one of the procedures in the legacy Acergy 
management system. 
 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVE 
The goal with this assignment is to use different methods to investigate 
opportunities of improving Subsea 7 HIRA procedure. Does HIRA procedure cover 
all aspect when it comes to risk exposure, and will it reduce the risk to a level that 
is ALARP? Also find out if the procedure can help people understand risk related to 
work better. A way of doing that is to find uncertainty factors in the HIRA 
procedure, that affect the procedure negatively. Factors that may not be in 
Subsea7 focus area. Find uncertainty that arises in the different stages of the HIRA 
procedure. Experience how the procedure works in practise and see where there is 
room for improvements. Investigate Subsea 7 risk view and see if the analyses 
used are covering all hazards. Make a questionnaire that shows how good the 
communication between office and vessel are and how well the procedures works 
on the vessel. Collect the important information and use it for discussion. In the 
end put the positive and negative factors against each other and see what we can 
improve on the procedure. 
 
 
1.2.1 Evaluation of process 
The first thing done in this thesis is evaluation of the HIRA process. The best way of 
doing that is taking part in as many risk assessments as possible, to get an good 
impression of how Subsea 7 perform a safe operation. A great thing with observing 
is the information one gets, making a better overview of how the procedure is 
done. But it can be difficult to collect valuable information, when taking part in 
meeting with many different enlists. The information one gets will not be as 
accurate as an interview or questionnaires.  
 
The main focus area is on PHA, HIRA stage 1, HIRA stage 2 and Toolbox Talk. 
Theses are the main stages in the HIRA procedure. PHA is a qualitative method its 
purpose is identifying all hazards and operability problems in a project. HIRA is 
qualitative method used to find out how big the risk level is on a scale from high, 
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medium and low. And implement actions that shall reduce the risk level to an 
acceptable level. Toolbox talk is a method for communicating the risk to the people 
that are performing the work. 
 
The second thing done is making a questionnaire that is sent out to a vessel. It 
consists of questions with different types of alternatives. It uses alternatives or 
open-ended questions. Open-ended questions may often result as the most 
interesting questions where new information can be obtained, but are more time 
consuming. The information we get from the questionnaire is subjective and that is 
good when the intension is to improve the safety system. The figure 1-2 is 
illustration of how the thesis is structured: First evaluate the HIRA procedure taken 
from legacy Acergy. Find uncertainty factors in the HIRA procedure. Then evaluate 
the methods needed for doing HIRAs. In the end, find a solution that can improve 
the HIRAs. 
 
 
FIGURE 1‐2 – EVALUATION STRUCTURE 
 
1.3 TERMINOLOGY 
Initials: Definition: 
ALARP As low as is reasonable practicable 
ASARP As safe as is reasonable practicable 
ETA Event tree analysis 
FMECA Failure mode, effect and criticality analysis  
FTA Fault tree analysis 
HAZID Hazard identification 
HAZOP Hazard identification and operability study 
HIRA Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analyses 
PPE Personal protective equipment 
SWIFT Structured what if checklist technique  
QRA Quantitative risk assessment 
HAZARD Is anything with the potential to cause harm. This 
can be a dangerous substance, part of a machine, a 
form of energy or a method of carrying out work. 
Lesson learned A database containing experience from earlier 
projects. The project engineers use this early in the 
project for getting information from similar 
operations. 
Risk Is the measure of probability that harm from 
particular hazard will occur. In Subsea7 risk takes 
account of possible consequences and is expressed 
by loss probability rating of, Low – Medium – High. 
Risk Analysis When we are estimating risk from the basic activity 
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Risk Assessment The process of analysing the level of risk, by 
considering those in danger, or what might be 
harmed. Then evaluating whether hazards are 
adequately controlled or can be controlled by putting 
control measures in place 
Risk Management Process of selecting the appropriate risk reduction 
measures and implementing them in the activity. 
Safety management A discipline producing frequency estimates of specific 
hazardous events. 
Uncertainty management A discipline producing prediction intervals based on 
probability distribution quantiles, in addition to mean 
values. 
TABLE 1 - TERMINOLOGY 
 
1.4 TYPICAL HAZARDS 
Below is an example of guideword used in hazard identification. It is 32 hazards 
that will affect the operation negatively if not taken into consideration. 
 
Slip/trip/fall hazards Flammable materials 
Chemicals/pollution/contaminants Moving/swinging objects 
Moving parts of machinery/vehicles Voltage 
Pressure/vacuum Noise 
Working at height/over side Fumes/noxious gases 
Dust Manual handling 
Position and entrapment Low/high temperature 
Lighting levels Radiation 
Low oxygen environment Hydrocarbons 
Restricted access/egress Posture 
Single point failures Unstable objects 
Weak structures Explosives  
Ship heave or roll Weather conditions 
Crane operations Bacteria, virus, disease 
Vibration Dangerous 
Sparks/material from 
welding/grinding 
Task with repetitive injury potential 
Table 2 – Typical hazards 
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2. PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT 
2.1 RISK DEFINITION 
Subsea7 definition of risk is based on project risk. And that is conditions affecting 
the new or old projects. Risk is the measure of probability that harm from particular 
hazard will occur. In Subsea7 risk takes account of possible consequences and is 
expressed by loss probability rating of, Low – Medium – High.  
 
 In the table 3 we have first Subsea7 definition of risk and then we have (Aven 
2008) definition of risk: 
 
Risk Definition 
A Expected hazard that may occur under the operation, that causes damages 
to personnel, environment or assets. 
P Evaluated probability for hazard occurring fund in Subsea7 probability 
guidelines. 
C Evaluated consequence of the hazard happening fund in Subsea7 severity 
guidelines.  
K Background knowledge of experts. Much of the experience is learned from 
Subsea7 database “Lesson learned”. 
Table 3 – Subsea7 risk definition 
 
Risk is related to future events A and their consequences (outcomes) C. Today 
we do not know if these events will occur or not, and if they occur, what the 
consequences will be. In other words, there is uncertainty U associated with both 
A and C. How likely it is that event A will occur and that specific consequences 
will result, can be expressed by means of probabilities P, based on our 
knowledge (background knowledge), K.     
 
2.2 UNCERTAINTY 
Subsea7 risk description is based on a gross risk analysis. With that we mean that 
they don’t spend much time on calculating the risk. The calculation of the risk 
analysis is done by the experience of the people executing the risk assessment. But 
there is uncertainty associated with the experience of the executers, this part is not 
considered in Subsea7 risk definition. Uncertainty U associated with probability for 
the hazard to occur and the consequence of the hazard. (Abrahamsen, Aven et al. 
2009) Say that risk associated with an activity is to be understood as: “risk is 
uncertainty about and severity of the consequence (or outcome) of an activity with 
respect to something that humans value”. Severity can be referred to as intensity, 
size, extension, scope and other potential measures of magnitude, and affect 
something with a human value (injury’s, assets and environments). Severity are 
characterised as consequences. The risk perspective in (Abrahamsen, Aven et al. 
2009) is “risk cannot be adequately described and evaluated by reference to 
probabilities and expected consequences only”. Subsea7 is calculating the risk by 
using qualitative methods. This is based on the background information from the 
experts. In the figure 2-1 we can see an illustration of the risk definition: 
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FIGURE 2‐1 – UNCERTAINTY TIED TO CALCULATION OF HAZARDS AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
2.3 PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Project risk management is a systematic process of planning, identifying, analysing, 
responding, monitoring and control the project(Institute 2004). The objective of 
project risk management is decrease probability and impact of hazards on the 
project. In the figure 2-2 we can see framework of the project risk management: 
 
 
FIGURE 2‐2 – PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
2.3.1 Risk management planning 
Risk management planning is the process of deciding how to approach and conduct 
the management activities for a project. Planning is important tool for ensuring that 
the level, type, and visibility of risk management are communicated with both the 
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risk and importance of the project to the organisation, to provide sufficient 
recourses and time for risk management activities, and for establish an agreed-
upon basis for evaluating risk (Institute 2004).  
 
The risk management plan describes how risk management are structured and 
preformed on the project. The planning includes the following: 
• Methodology defines how we do the work, tools used and data sources that 
may be used to perform risk management. 
• Roles and responsibilities defines the leader of the project, who is supporting 
the project, and risk management team membership for each type of activity in 
the risk management plan, and assigned people roles and responsibility. 
• Budgeting assigned resources and estimated cost for risk management. 
• Timing defines when and how often the risk management process will be 
preformed throughout the project life cycle. 
• Risk categories are structured to ensure a systematic process of identifying risk 
and contribute the effectiveness and quality of risk identifying. Companies often 
use a risk breakdown structure (RBS) for helping the identifying of the risk. 
• Definition of risk probability and consequences are a way of making sure the 
quality and credibility of qualitative risk analysis process are good enough. A 
scale representing probability value from “very likely” to “almost certainty” can 
be used. And the consequences have to be defined as well, normally scale 
severity, injury, environment and assets.  
• Probability and consequence matrix is a way of prioritizing hazards in a risk 
matrix. The combinations of probability and consequence will lead to the 
hazards being rated as “high,” “medium,” or “low”. One has to implement 
corrective action if the risk is too high. 
• Reporting formats are very important, because the outcome of the risk 
management process are documented and communicated. 
• Tracking documents are good ways of informing important factors in later 
projects.      
 
 
2.3.2 Risk identification 
Risk identification determines which hazards might affect the project and 
documents their characteristics. Participants in risk identification can include the 
following: project manager, project engineers, HSE advisor and experts from 
outside the project team. Experts can be customers, users, other project managers, 
stakeholders and risk management experts. Risk identification is an on going 
process as the project progresses through its life cycle. The involvement from 
project team and experts will vary from case to case trough project life cycle. But 
project team should be involved in the process so they can develop and maintain a 
sense of ownership of, and responsible for, hazards and corrective measures. The 
hazards are then saved in a risk register. It contains the outcome of risk 
management processes.  
 
Recommended in a risk register: List of identified hazards contains root causes and 
uncertain project assumptions. Potential responses to a hazard may be identified 
during the risk identification. These responses are used to lowering the risk level. 
Find the root cause of the hazards. Sometimes it can occur new risk categories, 
which are useful when updating the process. Underneath there are some example 
of risk identification tools and techniques: 
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1. Documentation review: A structured review may be preformed of: project 
documentation, including plans, assumptions, prior project files, and other 
information. 
2. Brainstorming is a good way of finding hazards. It is important that some of the 
project team has different expertise. Then it is easier to find ideas about 
project hazards. 
3. Checklist analysis can be based on historical data and knowledge that has been 
accumulated in similar projects. The checklist should be reviewed during 
project closure to improve it for use on future projects. 
 
 
2.3.3 Qualitative risk analysis 
Qualitative risk analysis assesses the priority of identified hazards using their 
probability of occurring, and consequence on project objectives. It is important to 
have good definition of the levels of probability and consequences, and have 
experts with experience support in the risk analysis. Risk probability and 
consequences assessment investigates the likelihood that each specific hazard will 
occur, and what effect it will have on project objective. The level of probability for 
each hazard and its consequences on each object is evaluated during the meeting. 
It is important that the hazards are evaluated after project guidelines. Evaluation of 
each hazards importance, and priority for attention is typically conducted using 
look-up table or a probability and consequence matrix. Such matrix specifies 
combinations of probability and consequences that lead to rating of the risk as low, 
medium or high. It is vital that project guidelines are clearly and easy to use. Then 
project team can analyse the risk correct. 
 
 
2.3.4 Risk response planning 
Hazard response planning is the process of developing options, and determining 
corrective measures to enhance eliminate or reduce hazards on the project. It 
addresses the hazards by their priority, inserting recourses and activities into the 
budget, schedule, and project management plan as needed. Planned Hazard 
response must be appropriate to the significant of the hazard, cost effective in 
meeting the challenge, timely, realistic within the project context, agreed upon by 
all parties involved, and owned by reasonable person. Selecting the best hazard 
response from several options are often required. One strategy for accepting the 
hazard is establishing a contingency reserve, including amounts of time, money, or 
resources to handle correct. 
 
Underneath we can see three strategies for hazards: 
• Eliminating the hazard by conducting the work differently. 
• Avoid hazard by changing the hazard management plan. 
• Transfer hazards by shifting the negative consequences. 
• Mitigate actions will reduce the probability for hazard occurring. 
 
 
2.3.5 Risk monitoring and control 
Hazard monitoring and control is process of identifying, analysing, and planning for  
arise hazards, and keeping track of identified hazards in the project life cycle. It can 
involve choosing strategies, executing contingency plans or fall back plans, taking 
corrective actions, and modifying the project management plan. Tool and 
techniques for doing it are hazard reassessment and hazard audits. 
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3. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
PROCEDURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
HIRA is a simple qualitative risk analysis methodology used to identify hazards that 
are associated with work assignments that is to be executed. This chapter is based 
on legacy Acergy`s procedure for safe operation. The identifying of the hazards is 
based on guidewords. There are two types off HIRAs in Subsea7, and that is project 
HIRAs and generic HIRAs. Project HIRAs are risk assessments done on every new 
task. Generic HIRAs are risk assessment done on tasks that are done regular. 
Generic HIRA can be something we do every day for example “walking in stairs”. 
Project HIRA can be laying new pipelines on seabed from A to B, even if we have 
laid pipelines before. It is not under the same conditions, but we can use the old 
HIRA as starting point. Therefore all the HIRAs are saved in a database.  
 
HIRA procedure is a formal process that must be completed before the activity has 
been carried out. This will ensure that people can carry out the work by using right 
methods, which are ASARP (as safe as reasonable practicable), to prevent injury or 
harm to themselves, the assets, or the environment. This procedure concentrates 
only on assessment of hazards, which may be present when caring out work 
activities not risk associated with general business or contractual issues. In the 
figure 3-1 it is shown how HIRAs are conducted. The main parts in the procedure 
are PHA, HIRA (stage 1 and 2) and Toolbox Talk.  
 
 
FIGURE 3‐1 ‐ HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE 
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3.2 PHA 
First thing done in HIRA process is different analysis called preliminary hazard 
analysis. PHA is often used to evaluate hazards early in the project being 
undertaken at the conceptual and front and engineering stage(Vinnem 2007). PHA 
is a set of different identifying processes, such as HAZID and HAZOP conducted at 
an early stage and throughout of the engineering phase. The engineering phase is 
when the engineers review and revise, as required for the installation plan.  How 
many PHA there are depends on how big or complex the project is. The PHA 
assessment is conducted in an office environment, usually by HSEQ advisor, 
managers and people that have ownership in the project. PHA main goal is as 
mentioned in “the risk managing planning” and “risk identifying” to determine a risk 
methodology for Subsea 7 by finding and assessing solutions, and identify 
measures that provide the lowest risk for every operation. When the methodology 
is agreed it will be outlined in the installation plan. 
 
 
3.2.1 HAZID - Hazard identification 
HAZID is a method for evaluating hazard early in the projects (DNV-RP 2003). It is 
a useful technique to revel weaknesses in the design and the detailed procedures. 
The HAZID is normally conducted by a group of experts that have different 
expertise. HAZID should involve relevant personnel, including riggers, shift 
supervisors, operational and technical responsible engineers, and leaders. The 
HAZID leader should be a skilled independent person, with both operations and 
specific engineering experience.  The process starts with presentation of the work 
scope and identifying all possible undesirable consequences that could occur and 
then to identify hazards, which would cause the consequence. It is usual to count 
all reasonable foreseeable hazards, whether each hazard poses a significant hazard 
to the activity in question. If a hazard is not significant like a vessel is hit by 
asteroid, the frequency for that to occur is very low. Once the hazard list is 
completed each hazard is reviewed to see whether it is significant and should be 
evaluated further. It is normal to use checklist and “lessons learned” from similar 
activities and previous HAZIDs for assistance when finding all hazards.   
 
 
3.2.2 HAZOP - Hazard identification and operability study 
The purpose of HAZOP is to ensure adequate functionality and back up of the 
project if operability problems occur.(ISO 2002) That means a systematic approach 
to identify problems in facilities, equipment, processes and assessing systems from 
multiple perspectives. We can split the unwanted occurrence in three different 
perspectives design, physical and operational environments and operational and 
procedural controls. In the design perspective one is assessing system design 
capability to meet user specifications and safety standards. Important thing with 
having a HAZOP is to have contingency plan for the critical part in the project. 
Timing of the HAZOP is important because one has to have time for correcting the 
design when discovering a fault in the project. The HAZOP is conducted by at team 
of experts that have different expertise. HAZOP start with presentation of work 
scope split in tasks, and then hazards that can affect the operation. The table 4 is 
categorising of the perspective in a HAZOP.(IEC 2001)  
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Design Assessing system design capability to meet user 
specifications and safety standards 
Identify weaknesses in systems 
Physical and 
operational 
environments 
Assessing environment to ensure system is appropriately 
situated, supported, serviced, contained, etc. 
Operational and 
procedural controls 
Assessing engineered controls, sequences of operations, 
procedural controls, etc. 
Assessing different operational modes – start-up, standby, 
normal operation, steady & unsteady states, normal 
shutdown, emergency shutdown, etc. 
Table 4 – Categorising of HAZOP perspectives 
 
3.3 HIRA STAGE 1 
HIRA Stage 1 is also conduced at an office environment, often by the same people 
that took part in the PHA. HIRA stage 1 is a method used to identify hazards, 
evaluate the risk, identify control measures and record the result. The risk 
assessment is carried out as we mentioned in “qualitative risk analysis” and “risk 
response planning” towards the end of the project, but well in advance of the work, 
to ensure that there is time, if there is something that needs to be adjusted. Then 
the procedure is sufficiently reviewed and checked and will either be issued for 
approval or approval for construction status. The main goals with HIRA Stage 1 is 
confirming the methodology that the risk is reduced to a acceptable level, and 
ensure all aspects of work have been assessed, including contingency methods; 
hazards identified; and control measures fully defined before going to the worksite. 
The assessment should also consider recovery situations when the work has to 
adapt to foreseen changing situations. Procedures for this kind of changes are 
“Management of Change process”. 
 
 
3.4 HIRA STAGE 2 
The people that are supervising the activities and reviewing the results of the HIRA 
Stage 1 normally carry out HIRA Stage 2 at the worksite. HIRA stage 2 is a method 
used to implement control measures on the worksite and ensuring that risk is 
ALARP. It is conducted well in advance of the actual work, but after project team 
have briefed the operation people on the overall work scope for the project. It is 
important that those how managing the work fully understands what has to be 
done and which control measures that need to be implemented. The HIRA stage 2 
is on one hand a way of controlling the HIRA stage 1 and on the other hand 
informing the people how to execute the work safely. Like we mentioned in “risk 
monitoring and control” identifying, analysing, and planning for newly arisen 
hazards, and keeping track of identified hazards in the project life cycle. 
 
 
3.5 HIRA STAGE 3 
HIRA Stage 3 will be done during the Toolbox Talk. Toolbox Talk is also carried out 
at the worksite by supervisors, normally right before the activity takes place. It is 
vital that the risk is communicated in the Toolbox Talk. HIRA stage 3 can also be 
linked to “risk monitoring and control” as mentioned in HIRA stage 2. Under the 
toolbox talk supervisors explains scope of work, control measures, recovery or 
contingency measures, and how is responsible for executing them. It is important 
that every participant understands their work roles and what type of risk they are 
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exposed for. And if the work starts to diverge from the main plan, it is important in 
this type of operations that people are aware of what has to be done. One should 
ask questions about these issues before activity start.  
 
Shift handover or peripheral activities, which could have an impact on the work has 
to be taken into the toolbox talk. Relevant task plans and permit to work (PTW) 
must be covered in the toolbox talk.  
 
If every enlist undertaking the task attended the shift briefing and discussed the job 
its not required to do both HIRA Stage 2 and HIRA Stage 3. But it’s important that 
everyone involved in the job fully understands his responsibilities; accepts the risk; 
the control measures to be implemented; how to recover the situation; or which 
contingency activities to carry out if things do not follow the main plan. It is very 
important that they stop the activity if faults are discovered faults in the procedure 
that have not been agreed and risk assessed.  
 
 
3.6 RISK MATRIX 
Subsea 7 risk matrix is based on the International Code of Practice (IMCA) provides 
guidance in determining risk level from the probability or likelihood of occurrence, 
and risk severity or consequences if the hazard occur. 
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FIGURE 3‐2 – SUBSEA7 RISK MATRIX 
 
For finding the right risk level we have to look at Subsea 7 risk matrix (figure 3-2). 
Risk matrix is based on legacy Acergy probability- and severity guidelines. The 
probability guideline is appreciated on probability of occurrence is potentially 
subjective and open to personal interpretation. Subsea 7 has made the definition on 
probabilities in the table 5: 
 
Definition Probability (%) 
Very unlikely X < 0,001 
Unlikely 0,01 < X < 0,001 
Possible 0,1 < X <0,01 
Likely 0.5 < X < 0,1 
Very likely X > 0,5 
Table 5 – Definition of probabilities 
 
The severity guideline is based on how big the consequences will be if hazard 
happens. Severity level is split in 5 steps; Negligible, Slight, Moderate, Serious and 
very serious. 
 
Severity Definition 
Negligible Minimal injury or health implications requiring no treatment or first aid 
treatment only. 
Virtually no damages to the environment, equipment or loss of 
function. 
Slight Minor injury requiring medical treatment. Some pollution impact to the 
environment. Damage to equipment requiring minor repair. 
Moderate Injury with no long-term disablement. Pollution incurring restitution 
costs. Damages to equipment requiring significant repair and loss of 
function. 
Serious A day away from work that stops any work duties. Pollution with short 
term localised implications incurring significant restitution cost. 
Damages to equipment resulting in major loss of operational capability 
and cost. 
Very 
Serious 
Fatality or multiple serious injuries. Extensive pollution with long term 
implication and a very high restitution costs. Damages with major long 
term implication for operational capability with extensive cost. 
Table 6 – Definition of severity 
 
Description of Subsea7 risk criteria: 
Risk criteria: 
Low risk Identified as “L” in the matrix. 
No additional immediate controls are required. 
Proceed with care. 
Medium risk Identified as “M” in the matrix. 
Activity must be investigated with a view to reducing the risk 
further. 
If a low risk solution cannot be found, the task can only proceed 
with appropriate management authorisation after consultation with 
specialist personnel. 
Unacceptable 
risk 
Identified as “H” in the matrix. 
Task must not be undertaken. 
It requires immediate action to avoid the hazard or substantially 
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reduce the risk by additional/alternative control measures. 
TABLE 7 – SUBSEA7 RISK CRITERIA 
 
3.7 PRINCIPLES 
Subsea 7 most important principle is that HIRAs and other types of risk assessment 
are conducted with the aim of reducing risk to a level that is ALARP.  
 
They must performed HIRAs prior to any work commencing. Project teams, 
departments, or people on the worksite complete the HIRAs when the hazard has 
yet to be identified, or assessment are not fully covered. 
 
It will be managed to focus on key issues, be kept short and simple and must be 
recorded either on the HIRA database or paper format. 
 
People that take part in the HIRAs will be identified in the record. 
 
HIRAs must be conducted in a systematic fashion covering the whole work scope 
using the key steps identified in the detailed procedures. 
 
 
3.8 TIMING OF HIRA 
All of Subsea 7 work is covered by risk assessment. Routine work covered by 
standard procedures and generic HIRAs may be referenced and reviewed prior to 
the work. But a specific HIRA must be carried out when:  
• Performing any non-routine activity.  
• Performing a new task. 
• New categories of people are involved.  
• Major changes to the work/ system are considered. 
 
The specific HIRAs should be conducted suitably in advance of the work activity to 
allow the control measures to be correctly engineered, closed out and implemented. 
And it might involve reviewing previous generic or specific HIRAs from the HIRA 
database.   
 
 
3.9 INVOLVEMENT 
When Subsea 7 is conducting the different stages of HIRA, it is important that the 
people involved are appropriate and competent to assess the risk. They should be 
well aware of the operation that is to be undertaken, and have detailed information 
of the risk assessment, so no time is wasted. Example if the chairman cannot 
manage the people and the meeting effectively, then time will be dragged out and 
people will start to lose focus. Therefore it is important that the chairman have the 
possibility to move on quickly or park issues that are secondary, but he must not 
forget to focus on real issues which matter to the safety of the operation. It is  the 
engineers that are responsible for preparation of scope of work before the different 
meetings.  
 
The table 7 identifies who should participate in the HIRA processes. It is the 
chairman, in liaison with the project or department manager who are choosing who 
should be presented at the different meetings in the procedure. Example it is not 
necessary to include all engineers or specialists for the whole meeting if they have 
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no particular involvement in a part of the work being assessed. It is important that 
the relevant operational people are included in all the discussions. 
 
 
 
 Denotes mandatory or designed nominee. 
 
Denotes optional and (1) denotes optional but least one from the person      
categories identified in that row should be present. 
Table 8 – Involvement in HIRAs 
 
3.10 RESPONSIBILITIES 
It is normally the project manager who is responsible and has authority for a 
particular task or piece of equipment in terms of production, safety, cost and 
quality. They are responsible for the technical quality of HIRAs and other forms of 
risk assessment. They must ensure that risk assessment on projects are completed 
and are ALARP, so the job/system/environment is safe for people and equipment.   
 
 
3.11 MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 
What happens if something is discovered under the execution, the risk assessment 
does not cover all type of hazards? During the HIRAs we evaluate hazards and 
operability problems found in the project. Some of the risk proposed by the hazards 
have already been addressed or controlled. If the risk is low we don’t need to do 
anything with it, but if it is discovered that the risk is not low we have to reduce the 
risk. The management of the vessel have to make a judgment whether the risk 
level is high, medium or low in terms of the risk of injury, damages to the assets or 
the environment. Subsea7 uses a management of change procedure on this type of 
judgment. This will give different cases:  
 
Worst case is that the risk level is found to be high and the management or crew 
can’t find measures to reduce the risk. Then the operation is stopped and the 
management have to alert the project manager in the office. A new risk assessment 
is done in the office and if it not possible to reduce the risk by doing the operation 
differently, if that is not possible the operation is stopped.  
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If the management on the vessel found the risk to be high, but have found risk 
reducing measures that reduces the risk level to medium. They have to 
communicate with the office project manager to see if he approves the reduction.  
They can continue the operation with care. This can be a difficult judgment that can 
go both ways, but the activity is highlighted so that will affect the execution in a 
positive way. 
 
 
3.12 EXAMPLE OF HIRA PROCESS WHEN DOING A MOBILISATION OF A 
VESSEL 
3.12.1 Scope 
This example illustrates how Subsea7 conduct a HIRA. It has to be highlighted that 
the HIRA demands some preparation, it is not just the meeting described below.   
Subsea 7 has been requested to support a platform pipeline installation contractors 
on a project using a survey vessel. The work will be preformed in different stages 
pre-lay, lay support and post-lay campaigns, as described under, however changes 
may occur. 
 
• Phase 1 of the pre-lay campaign involves; Installation of contracts (concrete 
elements that are making the pipe line stabile), and grout inflatable pipeline 
support base, removal of EEC (External End Cap)/TSU (Temporary Seal Unit), and 
pull-out of tag line. 
• Phase 2 of the pre-lay campaign involves; Installation of pull-in ramp foundation 
plate, EEC removal and EEC/TSU recovery, recovery of feeder wire, and installation 
of Ø90mm pull-in wire and installation of guide posts, and temporary EEC 
 
This is an operation that Subsea 7 cannot conduct with only one vessel, therefor 
they will use two vessels. The second vessel will support the lay activities such as; 
Temporary EEC recovery, ROV (Remote Operated Vehicle) support during pipeline 
pull-in, lay and lay-down, installation of a grout inflatable pipeline support pyramid, 
installation of the seal tube grout bung clamp, pipe lay buckle contingency 
operations. 
 
• Post-lay support campaign involves; Counteract recovery, pull-in wire 
demobilisation from platform, assistance during pipe line de-watering, recovery of  
buoyancy elements, yoke and clamp half-shells. 
 
The scope of this example is the mobilisation of the vessel when preparing Phase 2 
of the pre-lay campaign. The tasks are described step-by-step in figure 3-3.  
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FIGURE 3‐3 – SCOPE OF WORK IN EXAMPLE 
 
3.12.2 Step 1 – HAZID 
The HSE advisor invites the right experts to a HAZID meeting. In this project the 
experts are: 3 HSE advisor, student, 7 engineers, 6 managers, 2 supervisors, 
captain and 2 coordinators. The HAZID starts with HSE advisor present escape 
ways and how a HAZID is done. Project engineers present tasks that are going to 
be done in pre-lay campaign phase 2. After each task use a guidewords for 
identifying hazards in the task. Guidewords are used for covering all aspects of the 
tasks. In the table 9 you can see how the hazards found in the HAZID are 
evaluated. After the hazards are found we look at corrective actions for eliminating 
or reducing the hazard from occurring. Which company that has to do the corrective 
actions, and the deadline for doing it. After the changes have been done it is 
documented, and the person that is responsible for corrective action have to sign it 
out. 
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ID. No Activity Hazards/Actions/Info Corrective Actions Performed 
Follow-up 
resp. 
Deadline Doc. Ref. Closed 
(initials) 
Appr. 
(initials) 
1 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Captain concerned that difficult to 
control deployment from a marine 
/ vessel point of view with chute 
and winch as shown going over 
the starboard side Aft. Re-
evaluate position of winch and 
chute for stern 23xecution23.  
DESIGN REVIEW MEETING 
was held to re-evaluate all 
possibilities.  
New deck layout was 
established to allow safe 
offshore 23xecution.  
Overboarding will be 
performed over the STBD 
(Starboard) side of the 
vessel. 
      Proj.Eng.   
2 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Insufficient bearing capacity on 
quay for heavy lift. Bearing 
capacity of quay to be verified 
ahead of mob/demob. 
Quays at base have a 
concentrated load limit at 
70Te pr m^2, which is 
sufficient. 
      Proj.Eng.   
3 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Consideration of interim 
demobilisation of empty winch to 
be made to ensure operational 
capabilities of vessel optimised 
(e.g. room for 2nd WROV  & 
grouting spread while B winch is 
still on deck – demob winch 
/remob). 
Optimised deck plans are 
made and available with 
Operational Procedures.  
      Proj.Eng.   
4 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Heavy lift subcontractor to supply 
lift plan which will be checked and 
integrated to Acergy mobilisation 
plan 
Lift plan according to 
Subsea7 guidelines will be 
issued /approved prior to 
operation.  
      Proj.Eng.   
5 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Winch-base bolted connection 
(including documentation for 
supply of bolts) to be confirmed 
by Acergy engineering. 
Sacrificial frame was 
designed and will be 
interfaced with the winch 
base to allow sufficient 
seafastening. 
      Proj.Eng.   
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ID. No Activity Hazards/Actions/Info Corrective Actions Performed 
Follow-up 
resp. 
Deadline Doc. Ref. Closed 
(initials) 
Appr. 
(initials) 
6 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Angle brackets on at least two 
sides of the winch base to be pre-
installed on deck to ease winch 
lifting/landing on its designated  
location during mobilisation 
Not necessary since the 
position of the winch on deck 
has been changed and it is 
now easily achievable for 
precise landing. 
      Proj.Eng.   
7 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Concern regarding vessel deck 
level during heavy lift. Vessel to 
be trimmed forward ahead of lift 
to ensure suitable level on deck 
during landing. 
Deck Layout for mobilisation 
of the winch has been 
modified to allow controlled 
and safe load-out of the B 
winch. 
      Proj.Eng.   
8 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Wire to be ensured secure on 
winch drum during mobilisation. 
Procedures to cover controlled 
release of wire ahead of 
overboarding. 
Mobilisation and Installation 
is detailed in Operational 
Procedures.  
      Proj.Eng.   
9 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Quay to be pre-marked for 
location of heavy lift crane and 
outriggers 
Mobilisation Procedure        Proj.Eng.   
10 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Lack of familiarity with winch for 
hook up and operation. B winch 
technicians to be available during 
mob and operation offshore. 
B winch Personnel will be 
present at all times. Ref. 
Operational Procedures for 
details. 
      Proj.Eng.   
11 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Difficulties with control of winch. 
Shareholder to ensure winch 
supplied with fixed and remote 
control systems. 
Ref. B winch Operational 
Procedures – Manual – Only 
Authorised B winch personnel 
will be operation the winch at 
all times. 
      Proj.Eng.   
12 Activity 1 – 
Mobilisation 
Concerns over noise and location 
of diesel generator.  Investigating 
electrical power to B winch. 
Diesel Powered hydraulic 
pump will be provided by B 
winch. Ref. Mobilisation 
Procedure  
      Proj.Eng.   
Table 9 – Record from hazard identification 
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3.12.3 Step 2 – HAZOP 
In a HAZOP it is normal to use the same experts as in the HAZID. It starts the same way with HSE advisor presenting the 
escape ways and how a HAZOP is done, and then each task is presented by the project engineers. After each task 
guidewords are used to find hazard and operational improvement related to the work. After the hazards are found we look 
at corrective actions for eliminating or reducing the hazard from occurring. Which company that have too do the 
corrective actions, and the deadline for it. Document the change in the procedure and then close and approve it.  
 
ID. No Activity Hazards/Actions/Info Corrective Actions Performed 
Follow-up 
resp. 
Deadline Doc. Ref. Closed 
(initials) 
Appr. 
(initials) 
1 
Activity – Mob 
Pre-mob familiarisation to be 
arranged prior to mob date. 
Arranged 
      Proj.Eng.   
2 
Activity – Mob 
All winches to be supplied with 
swivels or non-rotating wires. 
Confirmed to be non-rotated 
wires. 
      Proj.Eng.   
3 
Activity – Mob 
Second fanbeam with multi-prism 
to be mobbed. 
Radius system to be 
mobilised. Fanbeam to be 
used prior to this with 
fan/beam prisms onboard 
platform. To be agreed in 
next meeting. 
      Proj.Eng.   
4 
Activity – Mob 
Additional transponder for the 
platform. A referebce use to be 
procured and installed. 
Done. Location for 
installation to determined on 
board vessel. 
   Proj.Eng.  
Table 10 – Record from hazard and operability identifying 
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3.12.4 Step 3 – HIRA stage 1 
After HAZID and HAZOP are done we have to do a HIRA stage 1. Normally same 
participants as in HAZID and HAZOP. The HIRA stage 1 starts also with a short 
presentation of escape ways and then HSE advisor describe how the HIRA stage 1 
is done. HSE advisor goes through the safety requirement that covers all the 
generic hazards. Project engineer presents the scope of work. Find every hazard 
with help from a checklist. After all the hazards are summarised, we have to do an 
evaluation of what the expected consequences can be. When all hazards and 
consequences are found for the task, the risk is evaluated. Risk matrix is used for 
quantifying the risk level (High, medium or low). The quantifying is done after 
legacy Acergy risk criteria. It is important that the chairman know how a risk 
assessment is done properly, if not we can end up with classifying the risk wrong.  
If the risk level is evaluated high, we need to eliminate or reduce it with 
implementing corrective measures. Each hazard is evaluated with the intention of 
lowering the risk level as much as possible. We look at the risk matrix after the 
corrective measures are implemented for lowering the risk level. If it’s not 
achievable to reduce the risk level, we have to do the task differently. After the 
HIRA stage 1 is done the procedure is sufficiently reviewed and checked and will 
either be issued for approval or approval for construction status. On the next page 
is table 11 where you can se the result of the HIRA stage 1. 
 
 
3.12.5 Step 4 – HIRA stage 2 
Then the crew on the vessel can conduct the HIRA stage 2. It is normally done 
some days ahead of the operations by the supervisors and executers. The 
intensions of HIRA stage 2 are controlling the HIRA stage 1 and see if something is 
overlooked. This is a good way of doing the risk assessment because it reduces the 
uncertainty factors of the risk assessment, when one goes through the assessment 
two times. On the page after HIRA stage 1 you can se the result of the HIRA stage 
2 in table 12.  
 
 
3.12.6 Step 5 – Toolbox Talk         
Right before the task is done there will be a Toolbox Talk that is the last step of the 
HIRA procedure. The supervisor does the Toolbox talk and this is where the risk is 
communicated out to the crew. The supervisor is gathering all the relevant crew to 
a short meeting. The toolbox talk can be complex so it is important that the 
supervisor prints out task plan, a checklist for toolbox talk and a copy of the HIRA 
stage 2 because it is impossible to remember everything that needs to be 
promoted. The list of corrective measures in the HIRA stage 2 is as one can see on 
the page after HIRA stage 1 long. Therefore it is important the supervisor 
communicate the most important measures first. Because it is a well-known 
phenomenon that people lose their focus when meeting are too long.       
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ASSESSMENT RECORD 
 
ACTIVITY:   
HIRA stage 1 
DATE :   PROJECT :  
 
 
LOCATION :  REF PROCEDURES: 
 
Attendees: 
Name Job Role Company Name Job Role Company 
 Senior HSE Advisor   Proj. Manager  
 Proj. Eng.   Technical Manager  
 Lead Proj. Eng.   OM  
 CR   Sen. Sup.  
 Survey   Lead Design  
 Ship Ops. Manager   Student  
 
Basic/ General  Safety Requirements   Project Specific  
1. APPROPRIATE PPE 8. POST BARRIERS / SIGNS 12. COMPETENT PERSON 16. Project HSE Plan 
2. TASK SPECIFIC PROCEDURE 9. SUPERVISION 13. Ship’s Generic HIRAs 17. Env Management Plan 
4. RESTRICT WORK AREA  ACCESS 10. CERTIFICATION 14. Ship’s Generic Procs 18. Subcontractors Technicians 
5. PERMIT TO WORK 11. TOOL BOX TALKS 15. Project Bridging Doc.  
Task/Activity Description Hazard 
 
Consequences to People, 
Equipment or the Environment 
Quantify 
Risk 
Recommended Corrective Actions / 
Control Measures 
Residual 
Risk 
Mobilisation / Demobilisation 
Of Pull-In Wire Installation 
Spread 
 
Swinging load 
Rigging failure 
3rd party personnel on 
quayside 
Working at height 
Heavy equipment 
Slips, trips and falls 
Awkward shapes / sharp 
edges 
 
Injury to personnel 
Damage to equipment 
Damage to vessel 
Damage to quayside 
Damage to environment (oil spill) 
 
E3 = H 
 
ALL personnel to stay clear of moving loads 
Use of taglines as required 
Ensure all seafastening is removed prior to lifting off 
vessel 
SOPEP kit available 
Drip trays to be used 
Bridge to be informed prior to heavy lifting 
 
C2 = M 
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High pressure / high voltage 
Unfamiliar personell to vessel 
Moving lifts / vehicles 
Hot work/Fire 
Dropped objects 
Comms failure 
Vessel movement 
 
  Mobile crane operators to participate in toolbox talks 
Subsea 7 liftplans to be used for mobile crane lifts 
Good housekeeping 
Highlight trip hazards 
Avoid equipment to be mobilised on top scuppers (free 
access) if possible, block off both if required 
Mark sharp edges 
Vessel electrician to connect main power supply to all 
containers 
 
 
 
Weather conditions 
Manual handling 
Working close to side of 
vessel 
SIMOPS 
Chute protruding from vessel 
 
  3rd party familiarisation 
Be aware of 3rd party traffic on quay 
Fire watch 
Monitor weather conditions during operation. 
Any person able to stop the work if see something 
unsafe. 
Bridge personnel to be aware of vessel traffic during 
lifting of B winch 
Port side of vessel towards quay during lifting of B 
winch 
Use of floating units if necessary 
Use of lifevests and safety harness when working 
close to side of vessel (rescue plan in place) 
 
 
Table 11 – HIRA stage 1 
 
 
     
Author: 
Thor-Atle Kolberg 
Document Title: 
Evaluation of Subsea7 HIRA procedure 
Page: 
29 of 57 
 
 
 
 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ASSESSMENT RECORD 
 
ACTIVITY:   
HIRA stage 2 
DATE :   PROJECT :  
 
 
LOCATION :  REF PROCEDURES: 
 
Attendees: 
Name Job Role Company Name Job Role Company 
 Proj. Eng.E   Medic  
 Rigger   Shift Supervisor  
 Rigger   Deck Foreman  
 Student   Client Rep.  
 Captain   Offshore Manager  
 HSEQ Advisor     
 
BASIC/ GENERAL  SAFETY REQUIREMENTS   PROJECT SPECIFIC  
1. APPROPRIATE PPE 8. POST BARRIERS / SIGNS 12. COMPETENT PERSON 16. Project HSE Plan 
2. TASK SPECIFIC PROCEDURE 9. SUPERVISION 13. Ship’s Generic HIRAs 17. Env Management Plan 
4. RESTRICT WORK AREA  ACCESS 10. CERTIFICATION 14. Ship’s Generic Procs 18. Subcontractors Technicians 
5. PERMIT TO WORK 11. TOOL BOX TALKS 15. Project Bridging Doc.  
 
Task/Activity 
Description 
Hazard 
 
Consequences to People, 
Equipment or the Environment 
Quantify 
Risk 
Recommended Corrective Actions / 
Control Measures 
Residual 
Risk 
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Task/Activity 
Description 
Hazard 
 
Consequences to People, 
Equipment or the Environment 
Quantify 
Risk 
Recommended Corrective Actions / 
Control Measures 
Residual 
Risk 
Mobilisation / Demobilisation 
Of Pull-In Wire Installation 
Spread 
 
1.Swinging load 
2.Rigging failure 
3.3rd party personnel on 
quayside 
4.Working at height 
5.Heavy equipment 
6.Slips, trips and falls 
7.Awkward shapes / sharp 
edges 
8.High pressure / high 
voltage 
9.Unfamiliar personnel to 
vessel 
10.Moving lifts / vehicles 
 
Injury to personnel 
Damage to equipment 
Damage to vessel 
Damage to quayside 
Damage to environment (oil spill) 
 
E3 = H 
 
1.ALL personnel to stay clear of moving loads 
Use of taglines as required 
Ensure all seafastening is removed prior to 
lifting off vessel 
2.Use only certified rigging. 
3,12. Area to be barried off prior to lifting. 
Bridge personnel to be aware of vessel traffic 
during lifting of B winch 
4.Qualified personnel.  
5.Subsea 7 liftplans to be used for mobile crane 
lifts 
Bridge to be informed prior to heavy lifting 
Mobile crane operators to participate in toolbox 
talks 
 
C2 = L 
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Task/Activity 
Description 
Hazard 
 
Consequences to People, 
Equipment or the Environment 
Quantify 
Risk 
Recommended Corrective Actions / 
Control Measures 
Residual 
Risk 
 
11.Hot work/Fire 
12.Dropped objects 
13.Comms failure 
14.Vessel movement 
15.Weather conditions 
16.Manual handling 
17.Working close to side of 
vessel 
18.SIMOPS 
19.Chute protruding from 
vessel 
20. Incorrect use of 
rigging 
 
  Port side of vessel towards quay during lifting 
of B winch 
SOPEP kit available 
Drip trays to be used 
6.Good housekeeping 
Highlight trip hazards 
7.Mark sharp edges. Avoid equipment to be 
mobilised on top scuppers (free access) if 
possible, block off both if required 
8.Vessel electrician to connect main power 
supply to all containers 
9. 3party familiarisation 
10.Be aware of 3rd party traffic on quay 
11.Fire watch 
12. Barrier off areas. 
13. Line of sight during lift. Banksman / Crane 
OP. 
14. Bridge to monitor vessel traffic. 
15.Monitor weather conditions during operation. 
16, 20. Work to be performed according to 
procedure. 
17.Use of lifevests and safety harness when 
working close to side of vessel (rescue plan in 
place) 
18. Bridge to monitor back deck activities. 
18. Any non essential deck activities to be 
stopped during heavy lift 
Any person able to stop the work if see 
something unsafe. 
19. Vessel with port side to quay 
20. Check correctly installed rigging before 
commencing lifts 
 
 
Table 12 – HIRA stage 2 
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4. UNCERTAINTY IN HIRA PROCEDURE 
 
4.1 RISK PICTURE OF THE PROCEDURE 
In this chapter we look at uncertainty factors in the Subsea 7 HIRA procedure. It 
will always be uncertainty as to whether certain hazards will occur or not, what the 
immediate effects will be, and what the consequences for personnel, environment 
or assets may be. Insufficient information, available knowledge and the right 
communication are some important factors for reducing the uncertainty in the 
procedures. In this chapter we want to prove that Subsea7 must have an 
uncertainty factor U in there risk description. A way of doing that is to use fact from  
text (Abrahamsen, Aven et al. 2009). In the theory part we have described how 
Subsea7 risk description is today, and that it is missing uncertainty factor U. If we 
look at chapter 3 there is uncertainty associated with the HIRA process. Underneath 
we can see uncertainty areas found in the process. 
 
 
4.1.1 Competence and experience  
The competence and experience of participants is a vital part in the HIRA 
procedure. The vessel may be operated by young team with limited experience, 
and/or be managed by inexperienced leaders on the different shifts. This will affect 
the overall risk picture, especially if the operation is complex. Therefore it is 
important that staff is trained in strict procedures which must be followed. Another 
thing that is important is to remember saving the experience from project done. 
Subsea7 is doing that with saving “lesson learned”. This will reduce some of the 
uncertainty associated with competence and experience. 
 
 
4.1.2 Following procedures  
First thing is that managers have to make sure that the procedures are updated, 
and staffs are trained on a regular basis. And they need to have the relevant 
procedures available. Second thing is how HSE culture is on the vessel. Is it a 
culture for taking short cuts and not operating according to the established routines 
and procedures? Are the designer aware of “pressure situations”, is he assuming 
that operating people are following strict routines. With that we mean example 
subcontractors that sign Subsea7 HSE requirements and don’t follow them. Because 
they don’t understand what risk is. This creates uncertainty on following the 
procedures. 
 
 
4.1.3 Involvement in the HIRA procedure.   
In (Aven 2008) book he recommends that in a HIRA process (HAZID, HAZOP or risk 
assessment) there should be between 3-10 persons in the meetings. One 
uncertainty in the HIRA meetings is how many and how familiar the expert is with 
the project. The problems in Subsea7 meetings are there are normally too many 
experts on the meetings. Sometimes project owner wants to take part in that 
decision. Project owner is deciding that 4th wheel experts have to be in the 
meetings. And the meetings may not be that effective if there are too many in the 
meetings and if the expert is not familiar with the project. Then the meeting can be 
dragged out because the expert asks too many questions about how project is 
being executed. What is positive with that is we may discover more hazards. If you 
are going in this meeting you must be willing to contribute with something and be 
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familiar with the project. And even better prepared with questions. But we don’t 
want too few on the meetings either. In the table 8 you can see how many experts 
Subsea7 recommend. One thing that is important to remember is involving of 
operational people early in the project. Because it’s easier for them with experience 
offshore to see problem areas in the procedures than experts from the office. If the 
chairman see that it is too many invited to the meeting. Then he should plan the 
meeting differently. He can split the scope into parts and coordinate experts in the 
meeting, so people with the correct experience are taking part where they can 
contribute this way we can reduce the uncertainty with having the correct experts 
on the meeting and the meetings will be more effective.  
 
 
4.1.4 Risk analysis 
Under the risk analysis we have to calculate the risks for describing how dangerous 
the different tasks are. The most usual risk analysis method of doing that is in a 
risk matrix. In this matrix you have both consequences and the probability for 
hazard occurring and there is uncertainty connected to the matrix. The higher the 
probability and consequences are the higher the risk will be. In Subsea7 we use 
probability guidelines and severity guidelines for evaluating the risk. The probability 
depends on such factors as the control measures in place, the frequency of 
exposure to the hazard and the category of person exposed to the hazards. The 
consequence will depend on the magnitude of the hazard (personnel, environment, 
assets). The guidelines intension is to help evaluating the correct risk level. One 
problem with the guidelines, they are not helping if the exerts have now 
background experience of the activity. The risk assessment matrix can have 
multiple outcomes. Like slippery deck, where the consequences can be in a range 
from nothing happens to a broken neck. This causes some uncertainty when 
calculating the risk. Therefore it can be difficult do decide the correct consequences 
for the risk calculation. Subsea7 choose the more pessimistic outcome and not the 
worst case like the more likely outcome. Therefore it is important to know the 
guidelines well, so that we can reduce the uncertainty in the risk analysis.     
 
 
4.1.5 Communicating the risk 
The last ting that is done before the execution of the task is the toolbox talk. The 
toolbox talk is a very important tool for communicating the risk out to the crew that 
are executing the work. If the supervisors having the toolbox talks cant 
communicate the risk, then there is now point in doing the HIRAs because that is 
the only way the risk can be communicated out to the crew. This gives the 
supervisor big responsibilities. The supervisors have to communicate: scope of 
work, control measures, recovery or contingency measures, and who is responsible 
for executing them. And if the scope of work is big and there are many control 
measures to communicate, as in a mobilisation then we have some issues. The 
main issue are crew and supervisor losing the focus, so Subsea7 should try to find 
an easier way of communicating the risk in the toolbox talk. One thing we can do 
for reducing the uncertainty in the communication of risk is having toolbox talk 
course for the supervisor.       
 
 
4.2 PRESENTATION OF RESULT AND RISK EVALUATION  
In the text over we have discussed some of the uncertainty factors in the HIRA 
procedure. We can conclude that uncertainty factor U should be implemented in 
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Subsea7 risk description. We can say that output from calculated probability P and 
evaluated consequence C depend on input from an uncertainty factor U. In Subsea7 
the probability and consequences are based on background knowledge K, and they 
could produce poor predictions. Poor predictions can arise from inexperience 
experts, and that can cause surprises that we don’t want to be overlooked. To get a 
better overview of the uncertainty tied to Subsea7 risk assessment we can 
implement (Abrahamsen, Aven et al. 2009) method. It describes that if we want to 
reflect the uncertainties to the management, it is recommended that the 
uncertainty factors should be classified within one of the three categories: high, 
medium, or low. In the table 12 there is shown categorization process that is based 
on some guidelines to ensure consistency: 
 
Low 
uncertainty 
All of the following condition are met: 
1. The assumptions made in calculations of P and 
evaluated consequences C. 
2. Reliable data are available. 
3. Broad agreement among the experts. 
High 
uncertainty 
One or more of the following conations are met: 
1. The assumptions made in calculations of P and 
evaluating of consequences C represent strong 
simplifications. 
2. Data are not available or are unreliable. 
3. Lack of agreement among the experts. 
Medium 
uncertainty 
Conditions are between those characterizing high and low 
uncertainty. 
Table 13 – Categorization of uncertainty guidelines 
 
The degree of uncertainty must be seen in context to effect/influence the 
uncertainty has on risk exposure. If we have high degree of uncertainty, combined 
with high effect/influence on the risk exposure, will lead to a conclusion that the 
uncertainty factor is “high”. But if we have high degree of uncertainty, combined 
with little affect off the uncertainty we can sett it “low” or “medium”.  
The result from this evaluation of uncertainties in the HIRA is presented in the table 
14. It is important that information about the factors (P, C, and U) is given to the 
decision makers. The two uncertainty factors that are considered to be most 
important are “Following procedure” and “Communicating the risk”. Therefore crew 
have to be trained on regular basis, this will reduce the uncertainty factors. 
 
Uncertainty factors 
Categories High Medium Low 
Competence and experience  X  
Following procedures X   
Involvement in the procedures   X 
Risk Assessment  X  
Communicating the risk X   
Table 14 – Result from evaluation of uncertainties 
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this chapter is to prove that Subsea7 had to take uncertainty 
into the calculation of risk. It shows that the risk description can be split into two 
parts, one covering events and consequences, and another that covers uncertainty. 
This acknowledges that risk cannot only be described and evaluated by referring to 
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probabilities and evaluated consequences. It needs to be evaluated together with 
an uncertainty factor U. 
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5. EVALUATION OF METHODS USED IN THE HIRA PROCEDURE 
In this chapter we want to look at the opportunities of improving the HIRA 
procedure. One way of doing that is comparing different risk analysis methods that 
identifies and responds to hazards. Subsea7 is using a HIRA process to find and 
treat the hazards in a project. We can use many different methods for describing 
risk. The most common ones in projects are qualitative, semi-quantitative and 
quantitative methods. Qualitative approaches are easiest to apply because it 
demands least resources, requires least additional skill sets. But it gives us least 
degree of insight. The quantitative approaches are demanding on resources and 
skill sets, but they give us a detailed understanding and provide the best decision 
foundation. The semi-quantitative approaches is described in-between the two 
others methods. In the end it is the project teams that decide which methods that 
are used, although all are in principle equivalent. After the approach has been 
decided we have to choose method that fit to the approach we have decided. We 
will look at the methods strengths and weakness, and see which method that fits 
Subsea7.  
 
 
5.1 DECISION FRAMEWORK 
In (DNV 2002) there are different ways of doing risk assessment and there is many 
different methods involved, and it is not always obvious which to select. We have to 
remember that there is no single correct approach for a specific activity, but there 
are approaches that are more suitable than others. A way of selecting the correct 
approach is having a decision framework. Underneath there are three way of 
deciding which approach that is used: 
 
Lifecycle stage implies greater or less flexibility to change design elements, the 
knowledge of specific design and operational details, and the availability of 
historical records. The risk assessment in lifecycle stage is an on-going process 
throughout the lifecycle of the operation. In table 15 are the different stages in 
lifecycle stage: 
 
Stages in lifecycle: Methods: 
Feasibility studies 
and concepts 
selection stage 
Relative simple HAZID, SWIFT, Risk Matrix or QRA with 
generic FARs can be used. 
Concept or front-
end design 
Based on previous design and “lessons learned” use SWIFT 
or Bow tie. 
Detailed design Sufficient information to do HAZOP, SWIFT, FMECA, FTA or 
QRA. 
Operation On-going risk assessment can be HAZOP, SWIFT or QRA. 
Abandonment Raise new issues of safety and environmental protection, 
suitable methods used are HAZID, SWIFT or ETA. 
Table 15 – Different stages in lifecycle approach 
 
Major hazard potential (Is not evaluated in this thesis)  
 
Risk decision context – novelty/uncertainty/stakeholder concern. (UKOOA 1999) 
Has made a framework for risk related decision support. This framework gives us 
help on which methods we should use but we need to have some information about 
the complexity of the project. First thing that has to be done are identifying the 
context level, is done after the guidelines in table 16. After the level has been 
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decided, we read horizontally across the framework. And read off the suggested 
balance of decision bases to be taken into account in the decision. Below we can se 
how the framework is structured: The framework takes the form of spectrum of 
decision basis, ranging from decisions dominated by engineers to those where 
company and societal values are the most relevant factors.  
 
 
FIGURE 5‐1 – RISK DECISION SUPPORT 
 
In the figure 5-1 we can see approach showing that risk assessment has a major 
input to type B decisions, involving some uncertainty. A and C decisions, risk 
assessment are still relevant but is not that influencing on reaching the final 
decision. 
 
Decision 
Context 
Type: 
Guidelines: 
A Nothing new or unusual 
Well understood risk 
Established practice 
No major stakeholder implications 
B Lifecycle implications 
Some risk trade-offs/transfers 
Some uncertainty or deviation from standard or best practice 
Significant economic implications 
C Very novel or challenging 
Strong stakeholder views and perceptions 
Significant risk trade-offs or risk transfer 
Large uncertainties 
Perceived lowering of safety standards 
Table 16 – Guidelines to risk decision context 
 
5.1.1 Conclusion  
In the energy industry project risk management is vital, because it makes clear that 
risk assessment plays an important role risk related decision, particular decision 
involving uncertainty. The decision framework from (UKOOA 1999) is a suitable 
basis for such decision-making. Today Subsea7 is using the lifecycle approach in 
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their project. A problem with this approach is if we have little or now design or 
operability knowledge, will limit the approach to risk assessment to coarser method. 
The positive thing with the decision framework is that it is guidelines for methods 
that are best for the project. But Subsea7 have many operations that are similar to 
each another and it may be more time saved to use the lifecycle approach. Once we 
have selected approach, it is then feasible to select amongst the wide range of 
methods for risk assessment. These include: 
• Hazards identification tools: HAZID, HAZOP, FMECA, SWIFT or FTA 
• Risk Assessment approaches: HIRA (Risk matrix), Bow-tie (FTA and ETA) 
 
5.2 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION TOOLS 
The first things done after an approach is decided are finding which methods that 
contain the necessary parts for finding all the project hazards. In this section we 
are looking at methods we can use for identifying hazards the best way possible. In 
the conclusion of “identifying hazards” we are looking at factors that are important 
when identifying the hazards. This is some of the important factors: gathering of 
information, identifying of hazards, team of experts, working in every operation. 
Below we can see the different methods that is evaluated in this thesis: 
 
 
5.2.1 HAZID 
Hazard identification done in Subsea7 is a qualitative exercise based on expert 
judgment. A team of experts with different background knowledge, early in the 
project, normally carries out the HAZID. This way we are more likely to not 
overlook serious hazards. In the figure 5-2 it is described how Subsea7 conduct 
HAZID. 
 
 
FIGURE 5‐2 – HAZARD IDENTIFICATION PROCESS 
 
If we look further into HAZID we can see that is should contain parts like 
(guidewords and task analysis), underneath we can see they contribute to the 
HAZID:  
 
The experts involved in Subsea7 HAZID should be creative, encourage identification 
of hazard and not previously consideration. By that we mean not use older HAZID 
as insurance, rather than using more time on the new HAZID, and find hazards not 
discovered in the older procedure. They should ask questions that investigate the 
work procedure. After the meeting compare with old HAZID and see if something is 
overlooked. That way one can capture the “lesson learned” from previous HAZIDs.  
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Subsea7 are using a way of task analysis to avoid overlooks. Task analyses are 
splitting the scope of work in tasks, and obtain comprehensive coverage of relevant 
hazards without skipping less obvious problem areas. The less obvious problem 
areas can sometimes be the little extra that triggers the hazard. 
 
Hazard guidewords is a very important tool for a HAZID, it gives use consideration 
of a full range of safety questions. The guidewords Subsea7 uses are design to 
ensure the HAZID team addresses key areas. They use the same guidewords from 
previous HIRAs. And that help preventing past accidents from recurring. 
Underneath we can see guidewords for HAZID and HAZOP: 
 
Guideword Description 
Weather Unclear weather restrictions or unexpected deterioration of 
weather. Weather forecasting
Impact Impact between objects
Position Object, grillage or barge not in correct position 
Drop Drop of objects from a higher level
Power No power or insufficient power
Instruments Malfunction or lack of instruments
Communication Malfunction or lack of communication eguipment. 
Communication lines
Movement Objects or vessels move in an uncontrolled way 
Stability Unstable conditions
Tolerances Tolerances for postioning, grillage tolerances, barge tolerances 
etc. 
Stuck Movement cannot be performed
Rupture Rupture of critical equipment
Access Insufficient access
Not cut No or insufficient cutting of items to be cut before an activity 
can start
Barriers No or insufficient barriers
Tension High tension in e.g. running wires or wire slings 
Execution A work task is executed in a wrong way
Procedures Missing or unclear procedures
Environmental Potential environmental pollution
Table 17 - Guidewords 
 
5.2.2 HAZOP 
HAZID and HAZOP are very alike in Subsea7. The main difference is that in the 
HAZOP the procedure for the work are nearly done and they focus more on the 
operability factors. Do they have contingency plans, if something does not function 
the way it is planed? That is very important because it cost a lot when the vessel is 
standing still and doing nothing. In the figure 5-3 we can see how the HAZOP is 
assessed. The only thing different in the methods are that HAZOP goes trough the 
contingency plans in the end.  
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FIGURE 5‐3 ‐ HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND OPERABILITY STUDY PROCESS 
 
Example: Let say that Subsea7 is doing a survey operation, where they need to cut 
off a flange on a pipe. They need to use a ROV for this job because the pipe lays 
400 meter under the surface. The ROV are equipped with a new type of steel cuter. 
What happens if the cuter breaks? Then they cannot complete the work on the pipe 
and have to sail back to the cay and repair the steel cuter, and that cost a lot of 
money. That’s way Subsea7 have contingency plans, it is a type of insurance if 
something go wrong. 
 
One problem with the guidewords in HAZID and HAZOP is that they can make the 
experts stop thinking, and that will give less insight into the nature of the hazards 
on the operation. Overall it is useful method in identifying hazard, but should not be 
the only identifying method. 
 
 
5.2.3 FMECA 
A failure mode, effects and criticality analysis is a systematic method of identifying 
failure modes of mechanical or electrical system, and evaluates the consequences 
as well (DNV 2002). It is a qualitative analysis technique, and Subsea7 are 
normally executing it in the system design phase. It starts with identifying possible 
“single point failures”, risk to the system and cost of loss associated with such 
failures. Then it identifies if its possible to eliminate “single point failures”, if that is 
not possible reduce the risk for it happening. In the end we identify contingency 
plans for “single point failures” that cannot be eliminated or reduced. Subsea7 uses 
the same matrix in the FMECA as in the HIRA refer to chapter 3.6, but the FMECA 
will focus more on cost associated with damages or loss of production. In the figure 
5-4 is an example of how the FMECA is conducted. 
 
 
FIGURE 5‐4 – FAILURE MODE, EFFECT AND CRITICALITY PROCESS 
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It is systematic and comprehensive method that helps identify al hazards 
associated with the electrical and mechanical parts in the system. Can be done by a 
single expert. It identifies critical equipment if a single failure would be vital for the 
whole system. 
 
The FMECA can be very uncertain if the experts don’t have experience with it. It 
requires good information about the system being analysed. Like good system 
drawings and that have to be develop before the analysis starts. It is just good with 
mechanical and electrical equipment and not procedure, process equipment and 
multiple human errors. Therefore it is best to use FMECA with other analysis like 
HAZID or HAZOP. 
 
5.2.4 SWIFT 
The structured what-if checklist technique is a method of identifying hazards based 
on the use of brainstorming (DNV 2002). It starts with a team of experts going 
through scope of work with a questioning attitude. The experts doing the analysis 
need to be familiar with the installation. It devied from the HAZID and HAZOP in 
some cases like: The discussion proceeds systematically through the installations 
modules or operation at the level of system or procedures rather than individual 
items or tasks. It relies on brainstorming and checklists to identify hazards. To start 
the discussions we need to begin with the words “what if”, “how could” and “is it 
possible”. The words should be prepared before the discussion. The figure 5-5 
shows how a SWIFT can be conducted. 
 
 
FIGURE 5‐5 – THE STRUCTURE WHAT IF CHECKLIST TECHNIQUE PROCESS 
 
This is a very flexible method of investigating any type of installation, operation and 
at any stage in the lifecycle of the project. It uses the experience of operating 
people in the meetings. This will give a better indication of the hazards. It moves on 
quick because it avoids considerations of deviations. 
 
Correct preparation of the checklist is very important, because if the checklist is not 
advanced enough it won’t help find the hazards. The experience of the experts is 
also important because they are the one that are identifying the hazard.  
 
5.2.5 Conclusion  
Subsea7 uses different methods like HAZID and HAZOP for finding al the hazards 
on the projects. And that is recorded in a risk register database, so it is easy to 
track when evaluating the risk level. They contain parts of different risk 
identification methods and that is important for getting a better risk picture of the 
operation. The different techniques that are implemented are guidewords and task 
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analysis. But they should also implement parts from SWIFT like “what if analysis”, 
this will question the procedures more. Also use FMECA on critical equipment so 
they don’t risk the whole operation stopping. That should give them better 
information about where the hazards are hidden. The best way of preparing the 
procedures is a combination of al the method evaluated.  
 
 
5.3 RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES 
When all the hazards are found we have to evaluate risk level, and see if it is 
acceptable. There is various ways of doing that and, the most common way in 
marine operation is using a risk matrix. Another way of deciding if the risk is 
acceptable is using a bowtie assessment.   
 
5.3.1 Risk Matrix 
Before the risk matrix is executed the project engineers prepare the new HIRA by 
implementing hazards found in PHA (HAZID and HAZOP) and finding similar old 
HIRAs and copy the hazards and consequences over to the new HIRA. After the 
hazards and consequences are recorded we calculate the risk from how likely it is 
for hazard occurring and the degree of severity, it is done after the legacy Acergy 
guidelines. The aim of risk matrix is to provide a basis for deciding whether a task 
is safe regarding assessing or not. It is the project owner and project management 
that decide if the risk is ALARP or not, and that gives them big responsibilities. This 
way of evaluating risk has both positive and negative factors.  
 
A good thing with risk matrix is that it is easy to apply, if it has clear guidelines for 
how to evaluate the risk level. Some of the more complex methods needs detailed 
calculations but this method just need some basic experience from the experts. It is 
just a few of the experts that need to know how to evaluate the risk level.  
 
It covers risk to the people, assets and environment, and that is making the risk 
decisions more correct. Then it is not just the people that are in focus. 
 
But there are some negative factors with the matrix to. Many judgments are 
required on likelihood and consequences and if the judgments are not properly 
recorded the basis for risk decision will be lost. That’s way Subsea7 always record 
the result in a HIRA database. If hazard occur and causes big damages to the 
vessel, then they can track the HIRA done on the project in theirs database. 
 
Another negative thing is manageability of the matrix. All of the prediction done in 
HIRA is based on background knowledge, and they could produce poor predictions. 
Surprises to the assigned probabilities may occur, when Subsea7 just evaluate 
probabilities and consequences grossly. As mentioned earlier one should implement 
an uncertainties factor in HIRAs. 
 
 
5.3.2 Bow Tie Analysis  
Bowtie analysis is another way of analysing the risk. Then we can use techniques 
drawn from quantified risk analysis, but we do not quantify the result (DNV 2002). 
This is a structured approach for risk analysis within safety cases where 
quantification is not possible or desirable. The idea is simple, to combine the cause 
and consequences analysis into a single diagram with the fault tree analysis plotted 
sideways on the left and the event tree analysis plotted to the right. We can find 
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the frequency by using a fault tree analysis (FTA) and consequence analysed using 
a event tree analysis (ETA). 
 
FTA 
Fault tree analysis is a logical representation of the many events and component 
failures that may combine to cause one critical event (system failure). It uses “logic 
gates” mainly “AND or OR” to show how “basic events” may combine to cause the 
critical “top event”. The top event would normally be major hazards such as “stop 
of operation”. We use qualitative identification to find combination of basic events 
that are reason for the top event to happen. The FTA start with top event, and then 
it work towards the basic events. For each event, it is considers what conditions are 
necessary to produce the event, and represents these as events at the next level 
down. If any of several events may cause higher event, they are joined with an 
“OR” gate. If two or more events may occur in combination, they can be joined with 
“AND” gate. In the figure 5-6 a fault tree analysis is shown. 
 
 
FIGURE 5‐6 – FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
 
ETA 
Event tree analysis (ETA) is a logical representation of the various events that may 
follow from an initiating event (component failure). It uses branches to show the 
various possibilities that may arise at each step. We can use it to relate a failure 
event to various consequences models, and it can also be used to quantify system 
failure probabilities, where several contributory causes can only arise sequentially in 
time. It starts with the initiating event and work through each branch in turn. A 
branch is defined in terms of question (B winch works). We answer it with either 
“yes” or “no”. Each branch is conditional on the appropriate answers to the previous 
ones in the tree. Quantifying the event tree is relative simple, normally preformed 
on spread sheet by hand or computer. The decision can be based on probability or 
start or stop. In the figure 5-7 the decision is based on start or stops the operation.   
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FIGURE 5‐7 – EVENT TREE ANALYSIS 
 
5.3.3 CONCLUSION  
Risk matrix is the most common approach for risk assessment today, and that is 
because it is appropriate for people new to risk assessment. Because it`s 
straightforward to apply. The matrix has some negative sides to, like difficult to 
deal with multiple consequences that arise from the same hazard. The bowtie 
format is not overly complex and non-specialist can understand it. A positive thing 
with the bow tie is that events are described in FTA and consequences are 
described in ETA. It is shown clearly how the events and consequences affect each 
other. In HIRA records table (11-12) this is missing and that give us less 
information of how the risk can affect the operation. But it takes more time and 
work to do a bow tie compared to HIRAs, and time is money. Nevertheless it may 
be possible to do something in-between them. An approach that describes the risk 
connected to the operation differently then HIRAs records. More precise information 
about where danger is hidden. Subsea7 can try to upgrade the HIRAs with one or 
two Columns. One with cause (cause of hazards) and maybe split the corrective 
measures in proactive measures (actions that prevent hazards from occurring) and 
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protective measures (measures that protect people, assets and environment from 
the hazards). That way the evaluated risk will be easier to communicate to the 
people doing the work and they will understand the risk better. 
 
 
5.4 COMMUNICATING THE RISK 
Today there has been a lot of effort put into minimising the risk of technological 
hazards in the offshore industry. However research shows that nowadays the, 
majority of incidents accident is caused by organisational and human 
factors(Mearns, Flin et al. 1997). The survey main goal is give information of 
organisational factors that affect the safety on the vessel. See if crew feels the 
HIRAs function the way it is supposed to do. 
 
The survey that was used on vessel is based on (Mearns, Flin et al. 1997) offshore 
questionnaire. The survey was change a little so that it fit subsea7`s vessel better. 
The biggest challenge with this survey is information gathered can be thin compeer 
to an interview (Bang 1998). The information gathered form the survey is the 
respondent’s expression, norms, opinion and values. The information gathered from 
the survey is quantified information analysed in a data worksheet. The probability 
for respondents gives the best answer because it is anonymous survey. It is an 
exemplar of the survey in appendix 1. Below is the structure of the survey:  
 
• Work environment are based on a scale and are questions of measuring the 
social environments of different types of work setting. An example of “work 
pressure” is “there is constant time pressure, to get the job done”. And work 
clarity is “the activities are well planned”.   
• Job communications are questions from a scale and are statements about level 
of communication in their job. Example of statement in the questionnaire is 
“There is good communication between the office and vessel”. 
• The safety behaviour was developed to measures respondents and self reports 
how they carry out potentially unsafe acts on a five-point scale. 
• Experience of risk is a scale developed to measure personnel perception of how 
safe they felt from being injured by hazard on the vessel. Respondents where 
asked to rate “How safe do you feel from being injured by” each of the hazards 
“Fire”. 
• Experience of risk is a scale developed to measure personnel perception of how 
safe they felt “you preform a non-routine activity” 
• Last question in the survey was open “what do you think about Subsea7 HSE 
(health, safety and environment) system?  
 
 
5.4.1 Results information: 
The result in the questionnaire may give different result from other surveys done on 
the vessel, because of different uncertain factors. The result from the survey is 
analysed on a worksheet in excel. It was 32 on board the vessel that answered 
questionnaire. The survey had 43 alternatives and one open question. Some of the 
questions where not answered. They where put in an own column N/A (not 
answered) in the analysis.     
 
General information: 
What is your job title? 
Figure 5-8 shows what kind of job title the responder has.  
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regulations implemented by onshore 
personnel unfamiliar with offshore 
condition`s. 
Safety campaigns rolled out before 
previous one`s finished resulting in 
excess complications.  
Too much safety is unsafe. Use 
common sense. 
 
Table 18 – Comments from open question 
 
5.4.2 Conclusion  
The majority of employers who responded to the survey generally felt “safe” 
regarding offshore hazards and “satisfied” regarding safety measures on board their 
vessel. They also reported that the communication between office and vessel could 
improve. The safety behaviour on the vessel was generally good, but one of the 
statement discovered that some respondent felt that they could execute the work 
better by ignoring some rules. The result from the open question showed that 
majority of the responders was satisfied with Subsea7 safety system, but some felt 
it could be user-friendlier.    
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